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HdQrs. 48th USCI
Vicksburg, Miss., Oct. 28th, 1864
Dear Mother:
Yours of 16th inst is at hand announcing the sorrowful news
of tlie death of dear little Lillace. She has only gone before
us a short distance. Wlien our time comes may we be as well
prepared to go as she was. It is hard, very hard to part witli
her but we know she is better off than any of us. She has left
a world of sin and sorrow, trials and troubles for one of endless
happiness and pleasure. Why should we mourn and be
unhappy. We must strive to meet her in that house where
she lives. I had hoped to see her here on earth once more,
l)ut I always felt as though I never would. I cannot tell what
impressed the idea on my mind.
. . .As soon as we are paid I will start for home. I have my
leave. You need not write until you hear from me again. I
am well. Your affectionate son,
B. F. Stevens
THE HOOVER-WALLACE CONTROVERSY
DURING WORLD WAR I
by Donald L. Winters
Asst. Professor of American History
University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls
In many respects. World W'ar I was a difficult and trying
time for Amerieans. Not only was the country involved in
its first war abroad, but there were accompanying problems,
tensions, and disagreements on the homefront. One such
disagreement ga\'e rise to a bitter conflict between an lowan,
Henry Cantwell Wallace, and a fonner lowan, Herbert Clark
Hoover. The controversy disrupted activities connt^cted with
the war effort and was to have repercussions later when both
men were members of the cabinets of Warren G. Harding
and Calvin Coolidge in the early 1920s.
Hoover, the son of a blacksmitli and small dealer in
agricultural machinery, was bom in West Branch, Iowa, in
1874. Both parents, who were devout Quakers, died before
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the boy was 10, and he went to live with an uncle in Oregon.
After graduating from Stanford University in 1895, he rapidly
gained wealth and world-wide reputation as a mining engineer.
Tlie outhrt'ak of war in Europe in 1914 found him living in
England, from where the govcrmnent of Belgium called him
to serve as commissioner of its food relief program, a position
in which Hoover gained acclaim for his administrative ability.
couTtciy Hoover Prrsiilciitiiil Library
Herbert C. Hoover
U.S.D.A.
Henry C. Wallace
Wallace, born in 1866 in Rock Island, 111., moved with
his family to Iowa in 1871. His father, affectionately called
"Uncle Henry" by his friends, was a Presbyterian clergyman,
but he left the ministry to take up light farming and later
entered the field of agricultural journalism. Wallace graduated
from Iowa State Gollege (now Iowa State University) in Ames
in 1893 and won appointment as assistant professor of dairying
at his alma mater. Two years later he and his father
established Wallaces' Farmer, which became one of the most
influential agricultural journals in the Middle West Besides
serving as editor of the paper, Wallace was an active and
prominent inemlîer of the Republican party and secretary
of the Gom Belt Meat Producers' Association, the principal
objective of which was to secure better transportation con-
ditions for livestock shippers.
With the entry of the United States into the war in 1917,
President Woodrow Wilson summoned Hoover from abroad
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and placed him at the head of the newly-created Food Ad-
ministration. Charged with responsibility for supplying
American and Allied forces with foodstuffs, the agency was
given broad powers over the production and distribution of
agrieultural goods. Shortly after assuming his new position.
Hoover appointed Wallace as ebaimian of a committee to
advise the Administration on pork supply. Disagreement soon
developed between the two men over policies designed to
stimulate hog production.
When it beeame clear in the latter half of 1917 that the
supply of pork was failing to meet mounting wartime de-
mands, the Food Administration attempted to correct the de-
ficiency through a propaganda campaign. Basing its approach
on an appeal to rural patriotism, Hoover's office issued cir-
eulars and press releases to the effect that it was tlie farmers'
duty to increase output. "Closing Üie gap in hog produe-
tion . . .," read one release, "is not only one of the big oppor-
tunities but one of the big obligations of American farmers. . .
This is the immediate war duty of farmers."' Along with ef-
forts to increase production, the Food Administration also
admonished the country as a whole to consume less meat.
Wallace, on the other hand, insisted that the approach of
tbe Food Administration would not attain the desired result.
"Appeals to the producer on the ground of patriotism," he
lectured Hoover, "will not bring an adequate response."
Convinced that production could be stimulated only by an
"economic appeal," Wallace urged a solution based on a theory
worked out by his oldest son.'' From a study he had made
of the relationship between livestock and grain prices, Henry
Agard Wallace concluded that the ratio of the market offering
per 100 weight of hogs and tJiat per bushel of com had to equal
or exceed 13.1 if production of pork were to be stimulated
to the degree needed in 1917. As long as hog prices remained
low in relation to com, he explained, many fanners would
find it more profitable to sell their com rather than to feed
'Undated Press Release of the Food Administration, copy in Henry
C. Wallace Papers, University of Iowa Library, Iowa Gity, Box 4.
"Wallace to Hoover, Sept. 24, 1917, ibid., Box 1.
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it to livestock, and pork production would thus remain below
tiie desired level.^  The "economic appeal" advanced by the
older Wallace, therefore, was the one in which the Food Ad-
ministration would guarantee hog prices based upon the for-
mula derived by his son.
Wallace's personal friend, (iifford Pinchot, was a member
if the Food Administration during the first months of the
war. The two men had become acquainted through Uncle
Henry, who had met Pinchot when botli were serving on the
Country Life Commission, a committee appointed by President
Tlieodore Roosevelt in 1908 to study rural culture and life
and to make recommendations for their preservation and
improvement. Approximately of the same age, of similar views
on many subjects, and possessing compatible personalities,
Wallace and Pinchot soon struck up a close aud lasting
friendship. Pinchot explained their warm relationship and
mutual respect, in part, as the product of a common ad-
miration for Roosevelt, which "bound us in an intimate bond."
As a result of both this friendship and an ingrained sympathy
for agrarians, Pinchot sought to use his position on the Food
Administration to gain adoption of Wallace's proposal for a
ratio guarantee.
Hoover had little interest in the proposal and set himself
firmly against it front the outset. At least part of the reason
for his opposition stemmed from problems involved with the
handling of a two-dollar-per-bushel minimum on wheat, for
which his office had already been made responsible. Claiming
that under tlie management of the Food Administration the
minimum had in fact become a fixed maximum price,
producers were highly critical of the agency. Small wonder,
therefore, tliat Hoover was reluctant to consent to the
establishment of still another guarantee. In addition, he wanted
to limit as much as possible government interference in the
economy.
y A. WaHace, Agricidturcil Prices, Des Moines: Wallnce
Publishing Co., 1920, 28, 33-35. After the war, Wallace puhlisli.d his
theory of the ratio method of determining prices in this honk. Siilwe-
quent reference to the hog-corn ratio will alway.s mean the r.'lation
between the price of hog.s per 100 weight and that of a hnshel of corn.
The grade of bogs will be understood to bo good to select.
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Pork production remained below the needed level, and
pressure mounted for a change in the Food Administration's
policy. Late in September 1917 Pinchot wired Wallace
suggesting that Hoover might now be persuaded to adopt
the ratio guarantee if hog producers were to demand it. and
he urged the farm editor to call a meeting of his advisory
committee to petition the Administration. Opposed to the idea,
Wallace thought that such action "would give the daily papers
a chance to say that the farmers are the one class of people
in the country who are demanding excessive profits and who
are threatening to reduce their production if they don't get
them." Besides, he told Pinchot, Hoover was fully informed
as to the wishes of hog producers and the views of the pork
committee. Still, Wallace implied that he would be willing
to call a meeting to discuss the ratio question if the Food
Administration directly requested it.^
Pinchot could understand Wallace's position. "But," he
argued, "we are dealing with a man nervously overwrought,
seeking to avoid action and sensitive to criticism." Pinchot
assured his friend, furthermore, that he had Hoover's promise
to adopt the pork committee's reeommendations on the ratio
guarantee." The farm editor was still rehictant to move on
his own, however, and refused to call his group together.
Failing to convince Wallace, Pinchot continued his campaign
within the Food Administration, and Hoover finally issued
an official request for a meeting of the pork committee. Held
in early October 1917, the conference voted to recommend
establishment of a minimum guarantee on bog prices
representing a 14:1 ratio, with no explanation for the increase
over the 13:1 ratio originally suggested by Wallace's son.
Echoing this decision, pork producers' meetings held in Kansas
Gity and Omaha following the Waterloo session passed iden-
tical recommendations.
^Telegram, Wallacf to Pinchot, Sept. 26, 1917; and Wallace to
Pincliot, Sept. 26, 1917, Wallace Papers, Box 1.
"Telegram, Pinchot to Wallace, Sept. 26, 1917, ihkl. When the
two men next met, Pinchot showed Wallact- Hoover's memonindiim in
which he promised to adopt the recommendations of the pork com-
mittee. Walhice to Pinchot, Dee. 11, 1917, ibid.
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Immediately after the Waterloo meeting, Pinchot was
apprehensive about the possible adoption of the committee's
recommendations. "If only we can get action," he wrote to
Wallace. "This is the one matter for anxiety now."" A
discus.sion with the Food Administrator a few days later served
to confirm his fears. Despite his earlier promise to accept
the committee's advice, Pinchot fumed, Hoover had decided
to reject the guarantee proposal and resort instead to exlior-
tation by the President to bring about an increase in pork
production. Pinchot regarded this as "the stupidest mistake
in policy I have ever seen a man in high office make. . ."
and could explain it only in Hght of IIoover"s "deep-rooted
antipathy to the producer, an antipathy which with the ex-
ception of a few individuals seems to color the whole Food
Administration. . ." He was at loss to comprehend "the blind-
ness which permits a man in Hoover's position so completely
to disregard the essential elements of the situation, and let
his personal feelings play so large a part in a policy of the
highest intemational consecjuence."' So incensed was Pinchot
tliat he resigned from the Food Administration a short time
later.
But Pinchot, is his disgust with Hoover, had distorted
the picture. In the same letter indicatintf that Hoover "seemed
determined to break his word to me," he also mentioned that
the Food Administrator intended to appoint a commission
to study the price-ratio theory. The responsibility of this group
would be to detennine the current ratio between the prices
of hogs and corn and to recommend what increase would
be necessary to stimulate the desired production. A short
time later. Hoover directed Wallace's advisory committee to
appoint the commission. After an exchange of several letters
in which Wallace attempted to extract a definite commitment
on the gtiarantee proposal ( Hoover remained .shrewdly
evasive), the farm editor finally called his committee together
in Chicago on October IS. At this meeting tlie group named
«Pinchot to Wallace, Oct. 6, 1917, ibid.
^Pinchot to Wallace, Oct. 11, 1917, ihid., and Pinchot to Mark
Sullivan, Fell. 24, 1921, Gifford Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Box 242.
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a study commission under the head of John M. Evvard, a
member of the staff of the agriculture department at Iowa
State Gollege. "A foohsh stunt," was Wallace's view of the
move, "but I suppose Mr. Hoover thinks it wise to have such
a report [as the commission would make] to fall back on."®
Though not as vehement in his criticism as Pinchot,
Wallace's irritation with the Food Administration was mount-
ing. Agreeing with Pinchot that antipathy toward producers
was part of the reason for tlie Administration's failure to act.
ho belie\'ed that Hoover's inability to understand tlie problem
of encouraging marginal producers was just as important
a factor, Iowa fanners could profitably market hogs at the
cnrrent price, which represented a ratio of about 10:1, but
they alone could not meet the demand for pork. If the Food
Administration expected to attact a snfficient number of far-
mers into hog production, it would simply have to take stronger
measures to increase the price ratio. Unfortunately, Wallace
lamented, Hoover was incapable of grasping that fundamental
fact.
Hoover, on the other hand, now claimed to have no
authority to guarantee hog prices. The enabling act had
specifically provided for tlic wheat minimnm, he explained,
but the Food Administration had neither the power nor the
money to maintain a minimuin on hogs. Meat packers,
moreover, were unwilling to support prices on a voluntary
basis. Thus the only action Hoover could see open to him
was to continue tht; propoganda campaign and hope that far-
mers would respond to the call for greater pork production.
The Evvard commission met in Ghieago on October 27
and submitted its recommendations to Hoover on the same
day. Gonceding that under normal conditions the laws of sup-
ply and demand should control price levels, the report de-
clared that the emergency situation brought on by the war
necessitated "definite artificial stimulus" to meet increased
demands. According to the commission's findings, based on
offerings at Ghieago, a ratio price o£ 12:1 was necessary to
cover the average cost of hog production, 13:1 to bring
^Wallace to Pinchot. Oct. 16, 1917, Wallace Papers, Box 1.
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production back to normal, and 14..3:1 to bring about the neces-
sary increase. Its report therefore recommended that the Food
Administration establish a guarantee ratio of 14.3:1 to go
into effect Feb. 1, 1918, and a guaranteed minimum price
of $16 per 100 weight for the interim period. Although not
an official member of the commission, Wallace's son did tlie
statistical work on whieh its findings were based.
If Hoover had hoped to avoid commitment to a ratio
guarantee, he reeeived little comfort from the study commmis-
sion's report. Aetion now had to be taken either in the form
of some type of acceptance or complete rejection of the
proposal. Tlie Food Administration's answer came on
November 3 in a statement by Joseph Cotton, head of the
agency's meat division, in which he stated tliat the Administra-
tion intended to use its vast influence over the hog market
to raise prices. Its transaction as the sole purchasing agent
for the Allies, American military, and Red Cross, Cotton ex-
plained, constituted a decisive factor in the market, and the
Food Administration proposed to use this influence initially
to prevent hog prices from falling below $15.50 per 100 weight,
"so far as we can affect them." As for hogs farrowed in the
spring of 191S, Cotton continued, the Administration would
"try" to stabilize the price at a ratio of 13:1, an action which
would presumably be undertaken sometime in tlie fall of 1918
when these animals were ready for sale. "Let there
be no misunderstanding of this statement," Cotton concluded.
"It is not a guarantee backed by money . . . It is a statement
of tlie intention and policy of tlie Food Administration which
means to do justice to the farmer.""
Although not entirely satisfied with Cotton's statement,
Wallace regarded it as the most encouraging sign yet from
the Food Administration. To be sure, it fell short of the com-
plete and immediate application of the ratio formula which
the farm editor desired. But he was satisfied that, if Hoover
would use fully tlie power of his office to implement the an-
nounced policy, the result would be a substantial increase
in hog prices.
^Prices of Hogs ( U. S. Food Administration, 1917).
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Throughout the rest of 1917 and into the next year hog
prices stayed above the $15.50 minimum but made little ad-
vancement from the previous fall. When it became evident
that the anticipated price increase was not materializing,
Wallace wrote to Cotton warning of continued meat shortages
and began to attack the Food Administration in the columns
of Wallace's Farmer. Hoover felt that the farm editor was
being unfair in \iew of "my whole-hearted adoption of the
principle and figures of the Everard [sic] commission and
our earnest efforts to carry it [sic] out to the letter . . .""*
As Wallace pointed out to him, however, he had adopted the
commission's recommendations merely "in part" and then
only after a costly delay for the producers. And in regard
to the really critical question of the 13:1 ratio, he reminded
Hoover, "nothing has been done to carry it out for the very
simple reason that you did not undertake to apply it until
next fall." Challenging Hoover's contention that the Food
Administration was attempting to carry out the principles
of the Eward report, Wallace retorted that "you have given
intellectual assent to the soundness of these principles but
you have failed to apply them.""
March 191S saw the appointment of another study com-
mission, this time selected by Hoover. With the exception
of Eward, none of the members had served on the earlier
commission. Regarding the creation of the new group as
something of "a joke/' Wallace maintained that its purpose
was to mislead farmers into thinking that the Food Ad-
ministration intended to do something in their behalf. Although
it met several times throughout the spring and summer of
1918, tlie commission issued no statements. Meanwhile,
Wallace kept up his pressure on the Food Administration.
Finally, when spring-farrowed hogs were beginning to
enter the market in September, tbe new study commission
published its first report, relative to Cotton's statement of
the year before. Applying the 13:1 ratio formula to the average
price of com at tlie country markets in "the leading hog
states," it declared $15.50 per 100 weight to be the price which
'"Hoover to Wallace, Feb. 3, 1918, Wallace Papers, Box 1.
"Wallace to Hoover, Feb. 11, 1918, ibid.
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the Food Administration must endeavor to maintain in order
to honor its commitment of the previous November. On the
surface the report appeared to accept the findings of the Ev-
vard commission as a basis for determining prices, but there
was one important difference. The ratios of the earlier report
were to be applied, not to the average price of com at the
country markets of the leading hog states, but to offerings
at Chicago. Since Chicago com prices were always somewhat
higher tlian at tlie country markets, hog prices figured on
the basis of the Evvard report would have been nearly tliree
dollars higher than the $15.50 recommended by the second
commission.
Hog producers had hardly comprehended the significance
of tliis development when the Food Administration armounced
its intention to abandon the ratio formula entirely. In a re-
port in late October the study commission explained that due
to the sharp drop in corn prices with the approaching end
of the war, the ratio metliod would work to the disadv antage
of pork producers. Confident that hog raisers did not want
their ineomes tied to declining com prices, the commission
recommended that the Food Administration return to the
poliey of supporting a minimum price. Hoover quickly adopt-
ed the new proposal.
Wallace was furious, eharging that the Food Ad-
ministration had deliberately deceived the farmers. He eom-
plaiiied that hog producers had increased output in response
to Cotton's statement. But when it came time for the Adminis-
tration to do its part, it avoided its commitment through the
transparent subterfuge of changing the com-price basis. And,
if this were not enongh, it dropped even the subterfuge a
niondi later and bluntly told farmers that no attempt would
be made to maintain the promised ratio.
Although tlie Food Administration used its influence to
bolster hog prices in 1918, Wallace's charges were wellfounded.
Cotton's statement, it is true, did not specifically aecept
Chicago com prices as the basis for tlie ratio formula. But
Hoover's "whole-hearted adoption of the principle and figures
of the Fverard [sie] Commission" represented an implicit
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acceptance—in view of the fact that the commission report
clearly stated that its findings were based on Chicago prices.
The reasons given by the Administration for abandoning the
ratio formula were also specious. While there was a drop
in corn prices in October 1918, th(! minimum hog prices which
Hoover's agency endeavored to maintain from that month
on always represented less than a 13:1 ratio, at least at
Chicago offerings. And this, after it had stated that the ratio
formula was being dropped because it would be unfair to
producers. It is interesting to note that hog prices did not
reach a 13:1 ratio level until after the Food Administration
had abandoned efforts to support prices in March 1919.
Hoover complained that farmers had misinterpreted
Cotton's announcement to be an absolute guarantee when it
was only a statement of policy which the Food Administration
would attempt to carry out. Tliis was true of many producers.
Despite numerous attempts to correct the misconception, there
was a genera] belief that the policy on hogs had the same
status in law as the wheat mininitun. Still, while this misunder-
standing led fanners to criticize Hoover unfairly, it by no
means justified or even explained his deception in changing
the corn-price basis when it came time for the Administra-
tion to fulfill its commitment.
The controversy had an unfortunate effect on the relation-
ship between the principal protagonists. Wallace and Hoover
developed strong antagonisms toward each other, antagonisms
which continued after the termination of World War I. In
1920, when Hoover's name was mentioned as a possible
presidential candidate, the farm editor launched a campaign
against him, rehashing all of the arguments against the Food
Administration's handling of the hog matter and urging far-
mers to unite in opposition to any move to place Hoover in
the Presidency. "It would be a real misfortune," Wallace
wrote to a friend, "if he [Hoover] should succeed in securing
the nomination in either of the pohtical parties." He felt
obliged to use his farm journal "to warn our readers against
a possible candidate for nomination whom we regard as
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distinctly hostile to their interests."'^ Wallace's editorials
provoked a discussion in Gongress and forced Hoover to send
a letter to the Senate in his own defense. Less than a year
later the two adversaries were to find themselves members
of the same cabinet, and their fight during the war was in
part responsible for the renewed bitterness which developed
between them over federal policy and action in the Harding
and Goolidge administrations.
"TEN CENTS A MILE
AND A FENCE RAIL"
Stagecoaching In Iowa
by LeRoy Pratt, President
Iowa Society for the Preservation of Historic Landmarks
The earliest settlers in Iowa either provided their own
transportation—horses, oxen, and wagons—or came up the
Mississippi River, landing at Keokuk, Fort Madison,
Burlington, Bloomington (now Muscatine), Davenport, Lyons
or Dubuque. These pioneers found work, started a business,
or went inland to stake out claims.
The heavy wagons of the settlers cut deep aits into the
tough prairie sod, along the tops of ridges and around the
marshes. As others followed in the same paths, wheel.s
gradually wore the trails deeper, to form long crooked scars
across the land. These were to become the highways of the
new country. Ditches were plowed beside the roads and
bridges built to span the streams. Road building was one of
the earliest and most important tasks of local government.
During the first years of the territorial and early state
period, Iowa travelers depended largely on water trans-
portation. The rivers were favored as the cheapest and easiest
means of travel, but they did not go everywhere. Stagecoach
sen'ice was extended slowly as a second type of public trans-
portation, as settlement spread to the interior. The service
'^'Wallace to H. S. Irwin, May 18, 1920; and Wallace to A. V.
Mather, April 21, 1920, ihid.. Box 2.

